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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-STANDARD FOR RELIEF IN RAcIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION CASES REQUIRES A SHOWING QF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
-Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' it did
not extend the coverage of the Act to public employers.' Consequently, the
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. decision in 1971 created the anomolous situation
that private employers were held to a tougher standard of scrutiny with
respect to racial considerations in their hiring procedures under Title VII
than were public employers under the Constitution.4 This curious develop-
ment in the relationship between public employment and Title VII caused
many courts to alter their standards for equal protection violations in the
early 1970's.1 In the realm of public employment, these courts began to
permit a showing of the disparate impact of an employment test on a
minority group to shift the burden to the state of showing that the test was
job related.6 Since this analysis had been used in the context of the consti-
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974).
2. For a general discussion of the legislative history of Title VII and its subsequent amend-
ments see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
3. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4. The statutory standard as interpreted in Griggs permitted the burden of proving job-
relatedness to shift to the employer upon a showing of disproportionate racial impact in the
employer's hiring procedures. "Congress directed the thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that, Congress
has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). The
source of the congressional power to create such a standard for employers is the commerce
clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also 10 U. RIcH. L. REv. 387 n.1 (1976).
This is a de facto rather than a de jure determination. The traditional fourteenth amend-
ment standard (de jure) for equal protection requires the plaintiff to prove that the alleged
act of discrimination was intentional. The Griggs standard (de facto) removes the necessity
of proving that an act was intentional and permits the plaintiff to win merely by showing
that the effect of the act is discriminatory regardless of the intention. See Washington v.
Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047-49 (1976).
5. See cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12 (1976). See also note
50 infra.
6. Several of the cases cited by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040,
2050 n.12 (1976), exemplify this type of analysis. These cases created a third tier of scrutiny
by shifting the burden to the state to establish job-relatedness, a Title VII standard, rather
than a compelling state interest or a rational relation. The burden was shifted upon a showing
that the state's employment test had a disproportionate impact on minorities. See, e.g.,
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1335 (2d Cir.
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tutional standard for equal protection violations, these decisions aban-
doned the traditional de jure test7 in favor of a de facto test which required
only a showing of impact without inquiry into the state's intent.8
Congress remedied the initial problem in 1972 with an amendment
which extended Title VII coverage to public employers.' However, interim
court decisions which had grafted Griggs' de facto standard onto the four-
teenth amendment in public employment discrimination suits'" had also
affected equal protection analysis in lower courts' dealing with areas other
than employment." Washington v. Davis, involving public employment
discrimination, is one of the cases which evolved during this era. 3
1973) (whites passed at 32 times the rate of blacks); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735
(1st Cir. 1972) (25% of black applicants passed; 10% Spanish-surnamed applicants passed;
65% of remainder passed); Chance v. Board of Examn'rs, 458 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (2d Cir.
1972) (whites passed at 1 /2 times the rate of blacks and Puerto Ricans). See also Silverman,
Equal Protection, Economic Legislation; and Racial Discrimination, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1184-86 (1972); Zimmer, Beyond DeFunis: Disproportionate Impact Analysis and Mandated
"Preferences" in Law School Admissions, 54 N.C.L. REV. 317, 342-46 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Zimmer].
7. Traditional equal protection analysis requires the state to treat people equally, permit-
ting only those differentiations necessary for furthering a legitimate governmental purpose.
The Supreme Court has generally applied a two-tiered analysis to legislative classifications.
Ordinarily, the Court requires only that a statute have some rational basis; but if legislation
deprives some people of a "fundamental interest," or employs a "suspect classification," then
the Court will invoke a strict standard of review and require proof of a compelling state
interest as justification. Racial classifications are recognized as suspect. See Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 H Av. L. REV. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]; Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect
Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
8. See note 4 supra.
9. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e(a)(1974). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 847-50 (1972).
10. Typical of the language used by the courts in finding the public employer liable is that
found in Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). After acknowledging the Title VII
standard as interpreted by Griggs, the Court stated:
We cannot conceive that the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it has been
applied in racial cases, demand anything less.
Id. at 733 (footnote omitted).
11. See cases cited at Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12 (1976).
12. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
13. The Supreme Court appeared to give its stamp of approval to the application of a Title
VII standard to public employment cases when it cited two of them, Castro v. Beecher, 459
F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), and Chance v. Board of Examn'rs, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), with
respect to the job-relatedness test in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14
(1973). While this citation was only directed at the statement concerning job-relatedness, at
least one circuit court relied on Green as an affirmation of the applicability of Title VII
[Vol. 11:209
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The employment test administered by the defendants in Washington,
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, had a disparate
impact on black applicants. A black applicant was four times as likely to
fail the test as a white applicant.4 The plaintiffs in Washington were
individual blacks who had failed the employment test. 5 They asserted that
the mere showing of the disparate impact caused by the test was sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the fifth
amendment," and shift the burden to the city to demonstrate that its test
was job-related. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was based
solely on constitutional grounds.
The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion and instead granted the
defendants' statutory and constitutional motion for summary judgment to
dismiss the case. 7 While it did not question the application of Griggs to a
public employer, 8 the district court felt that the defendants met the bur-
den of proving job-relatedness. 9 By showing a good faith effort to recruit
blacks and a high correlation of the results on the employment test with
the performance during the seventeen-week training period, the defen-
dants overcame the prima facie case of discrimination."0 Reversing the
district court decision, the circuit court found that the defendants had
failed to meet their "heavy burden" of proving job-relatedness.' The cir-
cuit court disagreed that the training program validation fulfilled the busi-
ness necessity requirement of Griggs.2" Both parties briefed and argued the
case before the Supreme Court on the premise that the issue involved was
standards in equal protection analysis. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Compare the impact on
blacks in Washington with the impact on minorities which triggered a burden-shifting in the
cases cited in note 6 supra.
15. Originally, the plaintiffs had intervened in a class action brought by black police
officers claiming discrimination in the denial of promotions. These officers did not appeal the
district court decision. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
16. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government.")
17. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2052 (1976); 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972) (semble).
18. 348 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1972) ("Thus the issue boils down to the merits of plain-
tiff's contention that that Test is not related to job performance. ... ).
19. Id. ("[T]he undisputable facts prove the test to be reasonable and directly related to
the requirements of the police recruit training program ... .
20. Id. at 16-17.
21. 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
22. Id. at 963-64.
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whether the business necessity test could be met by showing that an em-
ployment test predicted performance in the job training program.2
Instead of deciding the case on this issue, the Supreme Court invoked
the "plain error" doctrine, 2 and found that the application of Title VII
standards in the constitutional area was misplaced. The Court's decision
is important for two reasons. First, it reaffirmed the principle that a de jure
finding is necessary for a violation of the equal protection clause. Second,
the case is important because the Court offered an opinion on the require-
ments for meeting the business necessity test through training program
validation, although the effect of this opinion on Title VII litigation is
unclear.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,21 the Court had earlier restated the
constitutional standard for racial discrimination and carefully affirmed the
de jure-de facto distinction. 2  The Court's foremost objective in
23. See notes 63-71 infra and accompanying text.
24. The Court's stated authority for going outside the issue presented in this case is Revised
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C.A., rule 40(1)(d)(2)(1968):
The phrasing of the questions presented need not be identical with that set forth in
the jurisdictional statement or the petition for certiorari, but the brief may not raise
additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented in
those documents. Questions not presented according to this paragraph will be disre-
garded, save as the court, at its option, may notice a plain error not presented.
Four of the five cases cited by the Court as authority for invoking "plain error" were
criminal cases. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. at 2047 n.9. The fifth, Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), involved the power of courts in procedural matters; but the confine-
ment of the plaintiff for contempt was the issue which prompted the Court to invoke the
"plain error." Id. at 16. In light of the past history of "plain error," its use in Washington
seems rather unusual. Compounding this oddity is the fact that Metropolitan Housing Devel.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030
(1975), was also briefed and argued during this term since Arlington Heights presented the
Court with many of the constitutional issues on which Washington was decided. Arlington
Heights was one of the cases cited disapprovingly by the majority in Washington at 2050 n.12.
See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
25. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
26. "[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segre-
gation. . . is purpose or intent to segregate." Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). Justice Powell
wrote a separate opinion in Keyes arguing for the breakdown of the de jure-de facto distinc-
tion in favor of "constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional applica-
tion." Id. at 219. In Washington, Powell joined the majority opinion, possibly having aban-
doned his former position that the requirement of intent is unnecessary in some instances.
Since Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the de facto - de jure distinction
has been the basis by which the Supreme Court determines whether a given state activity
violates the equal protection clause. See note 7 supra. There is heavy reliance in Washington
on the numerous jury selection cases which stress the need for an intent to discriminate before
there is a violation. 96 S. Ct. at 2047-48. Maintaining the distinction between de facto and
de jure has not always been easy, however. While the Court has never expressly announced
[Vol. 11:209
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Washington was to distinguish this constitutional standard for establish-
ing a violation of the equal protection clause from the statutory standard
for establishing employment discrimination under Title VII. Clearly, the
majority views de jure discrimination essentially in terms of discriminatory
intent, coupled with any resultant disparate impact upon a minority
group.27 While the main thrust of the opinion is aimed at defining the role
of disproportionate impact evidence, both elements for establishing a
constitutional violation are reviewed. A major problem for the Court in
Washington was to outline methods for proving discriminatory intent and
defining precisely what constitutes such intent.
In defining the method for establishing discriminatory intent the Court,
citing James v. Valtierra and Jefferson v. Hackney,2 favored a stricter
constitutional standard of proof of intent. These cases reject the notion
that discriminatory intent may be established merely based on probable
impact." By emphasizing the analysis in these cases, 31 the Court makes it
any other standard, the implication from some decisions was that intent was not necessarily
an element. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971). See also Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 283-98 (1972).
27. The central purpose of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race. . . . But our
cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard
to whether it reflects a racially discriminating purpose, is unconstitutional solely be-
cause it has a racially disproportionate impact.
96 S. Ct. at 2047 (emphasis in original).
28. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
29. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
30. Valtierra and Hackney both presented the Court with an opportunity to extend equal
protection analysis to cover instances where the natural consequences of the state's act served
to place a burden on minority citizens even though the state did not knowingly intend to make
racial classifications.
These two cases are strong statements by the Court that the intent required is actual
subjective knowledge on the part of the state that it is making a racial classification. This
does not mean that the intent must be an evil intent, but that the standard of intent that
obtains in tort law is not enough. That is, a plaintiff cannot be successful by merely showing
that the natural and reasonably foreseeable consequences of the state's act would produce a
racial classification. However, three circuits appear to have adopted the tort standard of
intent for their equal protection analyses, at least with respect to their school cases. United
States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Hart v.
Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Michigan State
Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
The intent requirement and the method of proving this intent are interrelated. Since they
require that the racial classification be a knowing one, the next logical step for Valtierra and
Hackney is to prevent the method of establishing intent from being inferred through circum-
stantial evidence.
31. 96 S. Ct. at 2048.
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very difficult for a plaintiff to show that a statute or rule, neutral on its
face, is motivated by racial animus.2 Despite the difficulty of this burden,
the Court said that this does not mean that a showing of disproportionate
impact is irrelevant or that a statute must be unconstitutional on its face.
33
Then it cited examples from its earlier cases of how a plaintiff might
establish that a statute is racially discriminatory.
Unfortunately for potential plaintiffs, the examples which the Court
chose are from a time when the discriminators did not exercise the subtle
distinctions which are prevalent in more recent cases. The methods of
proving discrimination cited by the Court are based on cases such as Yick
Wo v. Hopkins34 and Hill v. Texas.3" While these cases do present models
of unconstitutional behavior, it is unlikely that many plaintiffs today will
encounter such pervasive exclusion. 6 In the jury selection cases of the
32. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), with Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969) and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
33. 96 S. Ct. at 2048-49.
34. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
35. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
36. The decision in Yick Wo established the proposition that a statute neutral on its face
can be applied in such a manner as to invidiously discriminate on the basis of race. 118 U.S.
356, 373-74 (1886). This is one of the two means suggested by the Court for future plaintiffs
trying to establish racial discrimination when a statute does not make a racial classification
on its face. 96 S. Ct. at 2048. In Yick Wo, a San Francisco ordinance prohibited the mainte-
nance of a wooden laundry within the city limits without a license. Since over two hundred
Chinese persons were denied a license for a laundry while only one white person was so denied,
the Court struck the ordinance down because it was only a pretext for discrimination. The
statistics in Yick Wo are so overwhelming that the only logical explanation for the result is
that the state was excluding people on the basis of race. It is unclear whether future plaintiffs
must have a substantial statistical case this persuasive before they can establish discrimina-
tion through disparate impact evidence. But see Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2660 (1976) (upholding Georgia bar examination in the face
of 100% and 50% failure of black examinees in 1972 and 1973 respectively).
The second example which the Court suggested as illustrative of the proper use of dispro-
portionate impact evidence is found in the jury selection cases involving systematic exclusion.
The Court relied exclusively upon jury cases to illustrate this second method of proving de
jure discrimination with evidence of disparate impact. 96 S. Ct. at 2048. Jury cases are
somewhat unique, however, since jurors are supposedly selected on a random basis. Therefore
statistical disparities between the percentage of blacks in a community and the percentage
of blacks selected for jury duty over a period of time should be more persuasive than similar
disparities in other areas such as housing, employment, schools, etc. where the selection is
not random. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (almost 33 1/3% of county was
black and at least 25 blacks were qualified, but no black had been selected for venire in over
30 years); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (continuous exclusion of blacks for 16 years);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (blacks constituted 10% of poll tax payers, but between
1931 and 1938 only 5 of 384 grand jurors were black); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939)
(50% of parish population was black, but no blacks had served on grand or petit juries for 20
years).
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1930's and 1940's, the Court found strong language that a plaintiff must
prove that the discrimination was motivated by an intent to segregate. The
methods of proving intent established by these cases are difficult ones for
a plaintiff to meet" unless there are enormous statistical disparities.
Another method of proving discriminatory intent is through the intro-
duction of direct evidence. Citing Palmer v. Thompson,38 the Court sug-
gested that this opinion may have misled the circuit courts into overem-
phasizing effect evidence.3 9 In Palmer the plaintiffs challenged a city ordi-
nance which was neutral on its face by introducing evidence that the
ordinance was racially motivated. The Court rejected the use of such evi-
dence. 0 The obvious impact of such a decision, as Washington recognizes,4
While these cases displayed enormous statistical disparities, the Court still looked for
further evidence (as in Smith that the white jury commissioners were selecting their frienfds)
before stating that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case. Later cases upholding
challenges to jury selection have relied upon racially biased selection procedures rather than
upon disparate impact. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (jury commission asked
race of citizen on its questionnaire); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (jury commission
made selections from segregated tax records); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (sepa-
rately colored tickets used in "random" selection from jury box).
Thus, plaintiffs who cannot show racial classification on the face of a statute and need to
use disproportionate impact analysis are left with only two alternative methods: "invidious
application" and "systematic exclusion." This will certainly not open a floodgate of equal
protection cases.
Perhaps the observation of Justice Stevens in his concurrence more accurately reflects the
situation which plaintiffs will face in trying to establish discriminatory intent.
[T]he extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as a question of fact or a
question of law, will vary in different contexts.
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what
actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor ...
My point in making this observation is to suggest that the line between discrimina-
tory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite
as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume.
96 S. Ct. at 2054 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimina-
tion Cases, 80 HARv. L. REV. 338 (1966).
38. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
39. 96 S. Ct. at 2049.
40. The situation in Palmer involved a desegregation order placed on the city of Jackson,
Mississippi, to integrate all of its municipal services. The city integrated all other services
but decided to close the swimming pools rather than comply with the court order. Since the
impact of the closing order fell equally on all races, the Court declined to find an equal
protection violation. In refusing to consider plaintiff's evidence concerning the city's motiva-
tion, the Court said "no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal
protection solely because of the motivation of the men who voted for it." 403 U.S. at 224.
See the discussion of motive inquiry at note 48 infra.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 2049.
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is to place greater emphasis on effect evidence. In footnote 11 of
Washington 2 there is an indication that motive inquiry is permissible in
certain circumstances. Lemon v. Kurtzman43 is cited as an example of
when such inquiry is proper. In citing Lemon the Court passed over an-
other establishment clause" case, Epperson v. Arkansas,45 which was a
clear example of the Court scanning the motives of the legislature. The
Court's reference to Lemon still casts doubt upon the strong statements
which the Court used in Palmer regarding motive inquiry.46 The area of
equal protection has not been completely free from motive inquiry,4 7 and
in view of the treatment it received in Washington, this issue may still be
open.4"
Having reemphasized the correctness of the de jure rule and stated the
proper perspective for effect evidence in the constitutional standard, the
Court then cited sixteen district and circuit court cases which misapplied
the constitutional standard by permitting a de facto showing to trigger a
burden shifting to the defendants. 9 These cases cover a range of areas in
which the standard was misapplied: employment, housing, zoning and
municipal services." There was a notable absence of school cases in the
list.' Many, but not all, of these cases evolved from the twisted logic which
42. 96 S. Ct. at 2050 n.11.
43. 403 U.S. 602 (1971), cited at 96 S. Ct. at 2050 n.11.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads in part "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of a religion ....
45. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
46. See note 40 supra.
47. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960).
48. Since Washington has restricted the ability of disproportionate effect evidence to estab-
lish a constitutional violation, the use of motive inquiry may be necessary to avoid a "catch-
22" situation for future plaintiffs trying to establish racial discrimination. The "catch-22"
situation which would exist is that a plaintiff must establish discriminatory effect and intent,
but he cannot prove discriminatory intent through direct evidence (motive inquiry) nor
through indirect evidence (effect evidence of disparate impact). Absent a racial classification
on the face of the statute or a blatant act by the State as in Gomillion, the plaintiff's burden
would be almost insurmountable. Therefore, motive inquiry may become necessary in some
instances. For a discussion of motive inquiry see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); MacCallum,
Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1887 (1970); Equal Protection, supra note 7.
49. 96 S. Ct. at 2050 n.12.
50. Id. The cases cited by the Court in footnote 12 are not overruled in their entirety but
only insofar as they apply a disproportionate impact test to establish a prima facie case of
unconstitutional discrimination.
51. While there were many other cases which could have been cited by the Court as
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the equal employment standards forced upon the courts in 1971.52 The
common theme of these cases is that a showing of disparate impact alone
can shift the burden to the state. Underlying each decision is the premise
that the state must insure that minority groups receive the same benefits
as whites regardless of the state's intention. 3 The decision in Washington
makes clear that not only is this de facto standard not constitutionally
mandated, but to permit such a standard to overturn innocent state action
would "perhaps invalidate a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the
poor and to the average black than to the more affluant white.""
The second important aspect of Washington is the recognition that an
employment test which accurately predicts performance in a training pro-
gram may be a valid means by which an employer can meet the business
necessity test. Upholding the district court's summary judgment for the
Police Department, the Court found that not only had these defendants
met the constitutional requirements, but their employment test satisfied
containing the ill begotten language, the failure to cite any school cases seems odd. At least
two circuits have adopted a de facto test in school cases. Pride v. Community School Bd.,
482 F.2d 257, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1973); Ciscernes v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 467 F.2d
142, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
52. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevel. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968), and
some of the other housing and zoning cases developed a de facto test before the employ-
ment cases began using it. Judge Skelly Wright's statement in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afld as modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969)(en banc), influenced this early move towards de facto.
Whatever the law was once, it is a testimony to our maturing concept of equality that,
with the help of the Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly recog-
nize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.
269 F. Supp. at 497.
53. Among the caqes in footnote 12, the Court cites only one, Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d
1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2660 (1976), with apparent approval. In Tyler
the circuit court refused to apply Title VII standards to the Georgia bar examination. 517
F.2d at 1095-99.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2051-52, citing Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. Rav. 275, 300 (1972), and Silverman, Equal Protection,
Economic Legislation, and Racial Discrimination, 25 VAND. L. R.v. 1183 (1972).
The Court is correct that disproportionate impact analysis would create equal protection
problems for many of the state tax and licensing statutes that we take for granted. This is
true, however, only if the Court maintains a strict, two-tiered approach to equal protection
in which the shifting of the burden is fatal. Disproportionate impact analysis would not
necessarily create confusion among the states if the Court adopted a less rigid standard of
judicial review. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Ray. 1 (1972).
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the job-relatedness test required to overcome the statutory burden.55
Griggs" and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody57 established the business
necessity doctrine which is applicable to cases brought under Title VII.
The business necessity test shifts the burden to an employer whose em-
ployment test is shown to have a disparate impact on minorities and re-
quires the employer to prove the job-relatedness of his test. 8 Albermarle
states that the Court will defer to the guidelines published by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in determining whether the busi-
ness necessity test has been met."8
While an understanding of the business necessity test developed under
Title VII law is important in Washington, there is no Title VII question
involved in the case." However, the same standards with respect to job-
relatedness have generally been held applicable in section 1981 cases,6
although the standards for D.C. Code section 1-320 are governed by the
Civil Service Commission.2 In order to prove that their test was job-
related, the Police Department established a relationship between the ori-
ginal test score and the performance of successful applicants during the
55. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment contained no statutory grounds for relief
but was based solely on fifth amendment grounds. 96 S. Ct. at 2045. The defendants' motion
for summary judgment asserted that the plaintiffs had no statutory or constitutional grounds
for relief. The statutory grounds asserted by the defendants were 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and
D.C. CODE § 1-320. The Court determined that the statutory as well as the constitutional
burden had been met by the defendants, and it affirmed the district court's grant of their
motion for summary judgment rather than remanding the case for further determination. 96
S. Ct. at 2052.
56. 401 U.S. 424, 433-36 (1971).
57. 422 U.S. 405, 425-35 (1975).
58. The EEOC defines "test" to include not only the traditional pencil and paper examina-
tion but also any type of "performance measure used as a basis for any employment decision."
29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975).
For further discussion of the business necessity test see Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TEXAs L. EVv. 901 (1972); Wilson,
A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimina-
tion, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844 (1972).
59. 422 U.S. at 430-35.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 2046. Title VII standards may be applicable through 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970).
For discussions of the relationship between Title VII and section 1981 see Greenfield &
Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil RightsAct of 1866,63 CALIF.
L. REV. 662, 664-67 & n.19 (1975); Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy
for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs - Civ. LIe. L. REV. 56
(1972); Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICH.
L. REV. 339 (1976).
61. Larson, supra note 60, at 94-96.
62. 96 S. Ct. at 2053 & n.16.
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seventeen-week training program. The test showed a high predictability
rate for training period performance which, the defendants argued, estab-
lished the job-relatedness of their test. 3 Since every successful applicant
who entered the training program eventually passed," and since the per-
formance in the training program was measured by tests similar to the
initial employment exam, 5 the plaintiffs argued that merely establishing
a relationship between the initial exam and training period performance
did not establish job-relatedness." The only cases prior to Washington
which permitted training program validation involved unusual circum-
stances such as very complex training or an especially lengthy training
period. 17
The Court declined to say whether the Civil Service Commission or
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines should apply in
this instance. Instead of choosing, it stated that training program valida-
tion was permitted by the Civil Service Commission guidelines and that
it was not forbidden by Griggs' and Albermarle's application of the EEOC
guidelines." As the dissent pointed out,69 this is a very tenuous basis for a
holding that the statutory requirements have been met because the Civil
63. See Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
mem., 476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228 (D.
Colo. 1971), afl'd, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 67 infra.
64. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 962.
66. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328, 1337-38 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1148-49 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Harper
v. Mayor, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1202-03 (D. Md.), modified and aff'd sub nom. Harper v.
Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91
(E.D. Pa. 1972). See also Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1598, 1649 (1969); Zimmer, supra note 6, at 375 & n.248.
67. There were two cases which the defendants relied upon for the proposition that training
program validation was permissible. See note 63 supra.
Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mem.,
476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973), held that qualifications for job admission could be validated
against performance in a four-year apprenticeship program rather than against subsequent
performance in the craft jobs. The length of time involved in Buckner's apprenticeship pro-
gram certainly blurs the distinction between job and training.
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228 (D. Colo. 1971), afl'd, 475 F.2d 216 (10th
Cir. 1972), involved the challenge of an airline's college degree prerequisite to becoming a
flight officer. The district court found that, despite the miniscule percentage of black flight
officers, the "direct and substantial correlation between successful completion of the training
program and a college degree" met the burden of job-relatedness. Id. at 235.
68. 96 S. Ct. at 2053. The defendants were held to have satisfied the requirements set out
by the Civil Service Commission, reported at 37 Fed. Reg. 21557 (Oct. 12, 1972). The Court
did not make clear, however, whether the Title VII guidelines established by the EEOC (29
C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3)(1975)) had been met.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 2056 & n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Service Commission was a defendant in this case and its guidelines were
introduced only to show that they complied with the Griggs standards. In
a statement which may have implications for the Title VII standard of job-
relatedness, the Court stated that regardless of administrative guidelines,
training program validation was the "much more sensible construction of
the job-relatedness requirement. 70 This language is just dicta with respect
to the application of training program validation in future Title VII cases,
but it serves as a warning that the Court may be willing to relax the job-
relatedness test in all areas. The failure of the Court to require the de-
fendants to establish some nexus between the training program and post-
training job performance indicates a reevaluation of the stricter standards
of Griggs.7 1
It is apparent that the Court is retreating from its earlier position as a
leader in the field of civil rights. 7 This trend indicates a desire on the part
of the Court to withhold any further extentions of civil rights remedies
absent some directive from another branch of government.73 By stiffening
the standards for proving unconstitutional activity and emphasizing the
availability of statutory remedies, the Court has shifted the burden to the
executive or legislative branch to provide the impetus for the future. Fi-
nally, while Washington makes it clear that the Constitution does not
place an affirmative duty on the state to remedy instances of de facto
segregation, the question as to whether the Constitution will permit the
state to assume such a duty is left open. 74
T. Keith Fogg
70. Id. at 2053.
71. Id. at 2053-54.
72. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563-66 (1974). In Lau the Court refused to reach the equal
protection arguments advanced, relying solely upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to place a
heavy burden on the state to justify its school program for Chinese-speaking students.
73. Id.
74. But cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The Court did not address the issue
of whether the Constitution would permit a state to adopt an affirmative action program, but
the decision in Washington indicates that the Constitution may be colorblind. In McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976), the Court interpreted section 1981 and
Title VII in a colorblind manner. These cases may be a foreshadowing of the result which
the Court would reach if faced with an affirmative action case in the constitutional area.
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